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SYNOPSIS
This article presents an argument against attempts to exclude the political perspective from the 
reading and reception of literature. Departing from the failed affirmation of radical autonomy of 
the Symbolic undertaken by poststructuralist philosophy (mainly Jean Baudrillard and Jacques Der-
rida) it argues for inclusion of the Real in the process of reading since it is always operational in 
the process of writing. Without going back to the metaphysics of presence, it puts forward an un-
derstanding of the Real that departs from the concept of disclosure (ἀλήθεια), but aims at a more 
negative and dialectical understanding of the Real as the force that disrupts and invades discourse 
in unwanted yet unavoidable ways. Edward Said’s reading of literary classics, which traces the link 
between culture and imperialism, is provided as an example of such a political reading of literature.
KLÍČOVÁ SLOVA / KEYWORDS
Poststrukturalismus; postmodernismus; dekonstrukce; reálno; strukturální psychoanalýza; poli-
tický závazek; postkolonialismus; imperialismus / poststructuralism; postmodernism; deconstruc-
tion; the Real; structural psychoanalysis; political commitment; postcolonialism; imperialism.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.14712/23366680.2020.2.6
how to speak of it
this thing that doesn’t rhyme
or pulse in iambs or move in predictable ways
like lines
or sentences
how to find the syntax
of this thing
that rides the tides
and moves with the tides and under the tides
and through the tides
and has an underbelly so deep and wide
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even our most powerful lights
cannot illuminate its full body
this is our soul shadow,
that darkness we cannot own
the form we cannot name
Sheryl St. Germain, Midnight Oil
If any place on Earth could epitomize the spectacular madness of contemporary cap-
italism, it would surely be New York’s Times Square: the endless stream of people 
pouring through day and night, the thin line of stock quotes cutting steadily across 
ubiquitous flashing screens, the abbattis of provisional scaffoldings permanently fas-
tened to the hectic array of buildings, the torrents of images that not so much repre-
sent as create their own reality, the corporate logotypes blaring from every side, the 
homeless mingling with yuppies, tourists, policemen, preachers and street artists — 
and all that submerged in a never-ending rumble of car traffic. It was right there, on 
Times Square sometime in the mid 1990s, that the French sociologist and philosopher 
Jean Baudrillard experienced a kind of epiphany that gave birth to a short text De%e 
mondiale et univers parallèle, published in the French daily Libération in early 1996:
An electronic billboard in Times Square displays the American public debt, an as-
tronomic figure of some thousands of billions of dollars which increases at a rate of 
$20,000 a second. Another electronic billboard at the Beaubourg Center in Paris dis-
plays the thousands of seconds until the year 2000. *e la%er figure is that of time, 
which gradually diminishes. *e former figure is that of money, which increases at 
a sky-rocketing speed. *e la%er is a countdown to second zero. *e former, on the 
contrary, extends to infinity. Yet, at least in the imaginary, both of them evoke a ca-
tastrophe: the vanishing of time at Beaubourg; the passing of the debt into an expo-
nential mode and the possibility of a financial crash in Times Square (Baudrillard 
1996).
In an ironic twist characteristic of Baudrillard’s writings, the sense of dread and peril 
quickly gives way to a depressed yet cosy feeling of relief, and to an overwhelming 
confidence in the perennial nature of financial capitalism:
In fact, the debt will never be paid. No debt will ever be paid. *e final counts will 
never take place. If time is counted, the missing money is beyond counting. *e United 
States is already virtually unable to pay, but this will have no consequence whatso-
ever. *ere will be no judgment day for this virtual bankruptcy. It is simple enough to 
enter an exponential or virtual mode to become free of any responsibility, since there 
is no reference anymore, no referential world to serve as a measuring norm (ibid.).
Baudrillard, a gifted writer and great prose stylist, was not a very original philoso-
pher. His investigations into consumer society and his concept of ‘precession of sim-




the much more astute writings of Guy Debord. Baudrillard may have authored only 
one truly original book, Symbolic Exchange and Death. He had, however, a rare talent 
for articulating in an attractive and relatively simple manner the intellectual Zeitgeist 
of his time. Along these lines the paragraph quoted above offers a neat summary of 
the central tenet of poststructuralism, an intellectual formation that expressed what 
may be labelled as the philosophical logic of postmodernism with its founding belief 
in the radical autonomy of the symbolic, and in the possibility of endless deferral. We 
can find the very same proposition in much more elaborate and nuanced form in one 
of the essays fundamental to poststructuralism: Jacques Derrida’s Freud and the Scene 
of Writing, originally published in the volume L’Écriture et la différence in 1967 (cf. Der-
rida 2001). Derrida, going back to Freud’s conceptualization of how the human ner-
vous system works and to his theory of trauma as a deferred encounter with what is 
too disturbing to be experienced in any immediate and direct form, sketches a model 
of our psychic functioning. Our nervous apparatus, trying to protect us from the most 
painful stimuli, creates detours, through which the experience is routed — a phenom-
enon that Derrida refers to with the French term frayer (‘to forge a path’), but which 
has been translated as ‘breaching’ in English editions of his works. We may be fooling 
ourselves that the stream of our conscious experience offers a kind of representation 
of ‘the real world out there’, while instead it rather serves as a screen in the double 
meaning of the word: a surface where a constructed image is projected (as in ‘a movie 
screen’) as well as a shield protecting the subject from what may be too disturbing for 
it (as in ‘a sunscreen’). Hence the deferral that is central to Derrida’s notion of differ-
ence, a philosophical concept deeply distorted in the US reception of deconstruction, 
where — along the lines of identity politics — it has become more or less equivalent to 
the word ‘difference’ as underlying concept of diversity. Derrida takes Freud one step 
further, claiming that since there is no way to directly encounter reality in any imme-
diate and ‘true’ form — the central dream of what Derrida labels ‘the metaphysics of 
presence’ — there is nothing but deferral: no path may be forged to the ‘outside of the 
text (dehors du texte)’ (Derrida 1974, p. 158). That is the conceptual root of what Baudril-
lard describes as ‘indefinitely deferred debt’ (emphasis added — J. S.)’.
There is one thing in Derrida’s essay that will strike any reader acquainted with 
Freudism: he seems to be describing only what may be called the normal or successful 
functioning of our psychic apparatus, when defence mechanisms efficiently protect 
us from what is too upsetting to be experienced. As Derrida puts it, ‘pain, the threat-
ening origin of the psyche, must be deferred, like death, for it can “ruin” psychical 
“organization”’ (Derrida 2001, p. 254). However true that may be, it does not paint 
the full picture. There are moments of traumatic breakdown, when the force of the 
outside is too imposing for any detouring path to be effectively breached around the 
painful content, moments we experience as nightmares, psychosis or parapraxis: 
slips of the tongue, mislaying of objects, unintended actions surprising even for the 
subject itself. These are the moments when the allegedly non-existent — or, at least, 
never present — outside invades the inside of our psychic writing with an unstop-
pable force. We may not be able to integrate that experience in any meaningful cogni-
tive pattern, but nor may we ignore the disruption it provokes. There seems to be no 
way to fit that basic fact of both our individual and collective life into the framework 
of Derrida’s differance. 
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What looks like a complicated and abstract philosophical argument can be very 
well related to our everyday praxis in the world of capitalist realism (see Fisher 2009). 
After the financial crash of 2008 it is impossible to repeat in good faith Baudrillard’s 
central thesis that ‘no debt will ever be paid’. Rather the exact opposite seems to be 
true: sooner or later all debts will have to be repaid. There is no endless deferral, no 
way to avoid the outside, no trick to forge a path that could allow us to circumvent 
it. As the British PM Boris Johnson has recently learnt falling ill with COVID-19 after 
ignoring all scientific advice on how to behave during the epidemic, ‘every lie we tell 
incurs a debt to the truth’ — to quote the dramatized testimony of Valery Legasov,1 
Soviet nuclear physicist before the committee investigating the Chernobyl disaster 
of 1986. The analogy can be taken further: what the financial crash of 2008 did to 
contemporary capitalism is what Chernobyl did to the Soviet state. It exposed the 
founding lie of the system, revealing the basic flaw in the way we try to collectively 
cope with inconvenient facts: ‘when the truth offends, we lie and lie and lie until we 
can no longer remember it is even there, but it is still there,’ as Legasov also stated in 
the dramatization of his original testimony. Of course, the concrete consequences of 
these traumatic encounters with the real (understood as truth breaking through lies) 
have not been exactly the same in both cases. Financial markets have not completely 
disintegrated as the Soviet Union did within years after the original disaster. What is 
similar, however, is the fundamental difference that the traumatic occurrences intro-
duced. No matter how much effort we put into a defence of status quo ante, the system 
has entered the phase of erratic transformation that in the contemporary situation is 
manifested by the invasion of the public life by various forces and positions that had 
been repressed before: populism and fascism on the one hand, but also progressive, 
emancipatory radicalism on the other. Neoliberal globalization based on free trade 
is damaged beyond repair (just think of Trump withdrawing the US, as it has been 
demonstrated beyond any doubts that the system does not work in the interests of all 
social groups as the old ideological hegemony imputed).
Contemporary philosophy has got a handy term to express the same problem in 
a more elaborate way: the structural-psychoanalytic concept of ‘the Real’. It is at the 
same time utterly complicated and extremely easy to grasp, depending on how deeply 
we want to investigate its inner workings.2 The Real is not a substance, but a position: 
something is Real for a given Symbolic-Imaginary construction, meaning it contains 
what is crucial and fundamental for that structure, though at the same time impos-
sible to articulate within the Symbolic-Imaginary realm. So, the Real is at the same 
time impossible in the framework of the given ‘system’ and necessary for its very 
construction. It is the founding ‘truth’ of any system based on ‘lies’ (or ‘illusions’ to 
put it in a less evaluating way).
The Real is not the same thing as reality. The latter is a combination of the Imagi-
nary and the Symbolic that is constructed primarily with the purpose of obfuscating 
1 As presented in the Craig Mazin’s mini-series Chernobyl aired by HBO in 2019.
2 For the most detailed yet also complicated account see The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. Book 
XXII: R.S.I. 1974–75, unpublished manuscript <http://www.lacaninireland.com/web/wp-
content/uploads/2010/06/RSI-Complete-With-Diagrams.pdf> [16.06.2020]. For a sim-




the Real — it is a story and a set of images that the subject constructs to shield itself 
from some of the most problematic yet at the same time constituent elements of its 
own functioning and of the situation it is in. In Derrida’s terms from his essay Freud 
and the Scene of Writing, reality is the result and the very process of breaching — an 
internal landscape forged by the effort to avoid the Real. So, in this sense, the point of 
the argument I’m raising here is not to disprove Derrida’s claims about what is hap-
pening. Of course, breaching and deferral do take place. It’s just that not everything 
is — or can ever be — deferred; there always remains something that resists breach-
ing, something we cannot totally subsume to the narration we call ‘reality’ and thus 
successfully defer, something that is never represented, yet remains always present. 
That unbreachable remainder is the Real.
The basic error committed by Derrida stems from the fact that he equates a pos-
sible outside of the text with a register of meaning and/or sense. It is stated expressis 
verbis in the paragraph that introduces the famous thesis on the non-existence of the 
outside:
Yet if reading must not be content with doubling the text, it cannot legitimately 
transgress the text toward something other than it, toward a referent (a reality that 
is metaphysical, historical, psycho-biographical, etc.) or toward a signified outside 
the text whose content could take place, could have taken place outside of language, 
that is to say, in the sense that we give here to that word, outside of writing in general. 
*at is why the methodological considerations […] are closely dependent on general 
propositions that we have elaborated above; as regards the absence of the referent 
or the transcendental signified [emphasis added — J. S.] (Derrida 1974, p. 158).
The Real it neither a referent nor a transcendental signified but what is le+ excluded 
a+er the symbolization is over (when the text is written). That is why it is not positively 
contained within the registers of the Symbolic-Imaginary (as the signifié of any signi-
fiant, nor as the referent of a sign or the actual object featured in an image), but rather 
negatively disrupts both of them.3 In this way we can differentiate the unconscious, as 
Derrida understands it, from the Real. While ‘the unconscious text is already a weave 
of pure traces, differences in which meaning and force are united’ (Derrida 2001, 
p. 265), the Real is rather the register beyond/before/outside/devoid of meaning. 
However paradoxical it may seem, given major cleavages between psycho-analysis 
and schizo-analysis, the best way of grasping the Real — if at all — is through what 
Félix Guattari called ‘non-signifying semiotics’ (Guattari 1984, pp. 76–77), a practice 
that goes beyond the relation of signifié to any signifiant, as well as the sign to its des-
ignate, focusing on disruption rather than representation.
It should be pointed out that when the term ‘truth’ is evoked in this conceptual 
structure, it is not truth in the classical, Aristotelian sense of a correspondence 
3 The relationship between the Symbolic and Imaginary is another issue that needs more 
consideration than can fit into such a short article. One may argue that the problematic 
cul de sac of Derrida’s deconstruction in explaining the origin of the symbolic order stems 
from the fact that Derrida stays too much in bipolar dichotomy of the symbolic and the 
real while ignoring the role of the third register: the imaginary; see Lewis 2008.
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 between statements and facts. It is rather a different, more ‘ontological’ — or even on-
tic — concept of truth. In this sense it approaches Martin Heidegger’s investigations 
into ἀλήθεια (alētheia), the term translated into English as ‘un-concealedness’ or ‘dis-
closure’ (cf. Kompridis 2006). Both formulations are pertinent as they convey the 
moment of negating an attempt to put something out of the picture (concealing, clos-
ing), so they expose the act of ‘lying’ that serves the purpose of hiding what is really 
there. However, there should be no going back to what Derrida describes as the ‘meta-
physics of presence’ (see Derrida 1982). The Real is not any kind of ‘hidden cache’ that 
would contain some kind of surplus — an unknown and unrealized semiotic wealth, 
the ultimate Eldorado of signification. It is a much more dialectical situation: the 
veil of phantasy conceals an emptiness and impossibility (a lack), yet that emptiness 
is the very condition of possibility for any semiotic relation to exist (the signifier is 
always made of stuff  that is un-signifying itself hence its submergence in the Real). 
We also need to distinguish the approach presented here from any kind of moral 
critique. Concealedness and closure is not the outcome of a deliberate dishonesty. An 
individual may truly and deeply believe in what she is saying and thinking, just as 
Baudrillard did. As such the Real is neither moral nor ethical, but a structural catego-
ry.4 The Real is like a light (although an impossibly dark light), that shines through 
the thick and abstruse curtain, at once enlightening and blinding us. We may not be 
able to see what it is exactly, because it is too much for our eyes (that is why we need 
to close them), however it is impossible to deny that this ‘Thing’ — the Real — is there; 
we cannot forge a path in the woods that would circumvent it.
The notion of the Real is the one we can use as a kind of guiding principle for the 
project of a political reading of literature. What it demonstrates is more negative 
than positive: every attempt at a completely apolitical reading of literary texts would 
ultimately fail — the political is the Real of literature. It does not mean that there is 
nothing but politics when it comes to literature, but rather that the political functions 
as the ever-present outside for all literary practice. Of course, ‘the political’ does not 
mean government and/or administration, but rather the practice of regulating our 
being-in-common as human and non-human subjects. As such it includes the social 
and the economic as its possible instances or aspects (respectively, the ones regulat-
ing interactions between subjects and material conditions of their lives). Understood 
in this way, any effort to eradicate the political from literature should be interpreted 
as an act of closure or concealment, and as such is ideological in its attempt to build 
a screen that would shield the literary text from its social, political and economic re-
ality. The political is by no means the one and only ultimate Real of literature. There 
should be no reductionism here: literature is also much more than politics, and my 
aim here is not to reduce it to any political content. My aim is precisely the opposite: 
to prevent a general purging of the political from the literary, and thus to demon-
strate that while the political reading of literature is not the only possible one, the 
apolitical reading will inevitably miss the fundamental dimensions of literature and 
writing. 
Every act of constructing a literary fiction by means of writing incurs a debt to the 
Real that would eventually come back to haunt that fiction. In order to make these di-




vagations more concrete I’d refer at the end to one outstanding example of the politi-
cal reading of literature: Edward Said’s book Culture and Imperialism. It is a quite well 
known work, so I shall just sketch an outline that will help to grasp the method I have 
in mind here. Said takes masterpieces of European art, in most part literary texts (but 
also works from other artistic fields, like Verdi’s Aida, for instance) and demonstrates 
their entanglement in the political context of their time. The most illustrative ex-
ample is that of Jane Austen (Said 1994, pp. 80–97). Her novels offer an expansive and 
realistic depiction of life in the early 19th century English upper classes. A lot of atten-
tion is given to the social circumstances that shape their existence, especially when 
it comes to the complicated position of women in the society of that period. What 
remains outside the picture, in such novels as Pride and Prejudice or Mansfield Park, 
are the social, political and economic conditions of possibility of the world depicted, 
namely the British colonial empire. Yet it is not entirely absent, and Mansfield Park 
can even serve as proof of Austen’s enthusiastic position towards the British over-
seas expansion. Reading her novels, however, one would never suspect that slaves 
cultivating tobacco and sugar on the other side of the planet provided the condition 
of possibility for the female members of 19th century English aristocracy to ponder 
their oppression and emancipation. It is by no means an attempt to discredit Austen 
as a writer or a person, much less to negate the importance of women’s emancipation. 
Neither does this kind of reading aim to reduce Austen’s work to a simple expression 
of the colonial and imperial mindset. Rather, it is an effort to open and enrich our 
understanding of her texts by showing that there is yet another dimension that one 
can explore in her work: that of the global political and economic interdependencies 
of its time.
Such a political reading of literature offers yet another very important advantage. 
In his grammatological exploration of writing, Jacques Derrida goes beyond the do-
main of the literary text as such:
And thus we say ‘writing’ for all that gives rise to an inscription in general, whether 
it is literal or not and even if what it distributes in space is alien to the order of the 
voice: cinematography, choreography, of course, but also pictorial, musical, sculptur-
al ‘writing’. One might also speak of athletic writing, and with even greater certainty 
of military or political writing in view of the techniques that govern those domains 
today (Derrida 1974, p. 9).
Even if we do not accept his view on the alleged lack of the outside of the text, we may 
very well embrace such a conceptualization of what writing is, one that approaches 
the theories of discourse and practice in 20th century humanities and social theory. 
From this perspective, the political reading of literature is part of a larger enterprise 
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